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TEN QUESTIONS 
 
The Journal of the National Security Forum (JNSF) Board of Editors posed ten 
questions on national security to a group of national-security law experts. Contributors 
were free to answer as many of the ten questions as they wished. 
1. Do Americans need to give up more privacy to be safer? 
2. Should the President maintain a distinct national security division at the Justice 
Department? 
3. What are the lessons from detaining non-U.S. citizens, labeled enemy combatants, at 
Gitmo? 
4. What is left for the Supreme Court to decide after the Boumediene decision? 
5. What changes, if any, should Congress make to the Classified Information Procedures 
Act? 
6. For purposes of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), should Congress 
(re)erect a wall between criminal justice and foreign intelligence at the FBI? 
7. Are any changes needed to ensure that National Intelligence Estimates are more 
accurate? 
8. Is global warming a threat to American national security? 
9. Is the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 good policy? Is it constitutional? 
10. What is the most important issue for American national security? 
RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS 
Gregory E. Maggs 
3. What are the lessons from detaining non-U.S. citizens, labeled enemy 
combatants, at Gitmo? 
The United States has undoubtedly drawn many lessons from 
detaining enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but I will 
address only three of them. I have singled out these three because, 
in my view, they are unfortunate lessons for the United States to 
have learned and because they have received surprisingly little 
public attention. 
The first lesson learned is that the United States should not 
take prisoners in the war on terror. Put simply, the United States 
has discovered through hard experience that the Nation is 
generally better off if its military and intelligence forces do not 
detain enemy combatants. Although capturing our enemies and 
holding them prisoner may incapacitate them and may yield useful 
intelligence, detaining terrorist suspects ultimately comes at a 
prohibitively high cost. Since 2001, the Government has become 
embroiled in enormous litigation over detainee issues, with no end 
to the lawsuits in sight.' It has spent stupendous sums in 
constructing and maintaining detention facilities.' And as anyone 
t Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, the 
George Washington University Law School. In addition to my academic positions, 
I am also an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. In this capacity, I have worked on 
various national security matters, including issues concerning the trial of enemy 
combatants for war crimes. The views expressed in this publication are my own. 
They do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or the Department of 
Defense. 
1. The discussion of this lesson builds upon an earlier essay that I have 
written, Gregory E. Maggs, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 971, 999-1006 (2007). I have included some of the same citations to 
support my assertions. 
2. See Warren Richey, Can U.S. Judges Order Detainees Released?, CHRISTIAN SO. 
MONITOR, Nov. 25, 2008, at 25 (reporting that the United States is litigating more 
than 200 habeas corpus cases). 
3. See Man Gomez, Pentagon Touts Progress at Gitmo Facility, USA TODAY, Dec. 
12, 2008, at A10 (reporting that the detention facilities alone cost more than $400 
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who reads the newspapers knows, despite all of this effort, the 
United States has subjected itself to unending domestic and 
international criticism for its treatment of detainees at 
Guantanamo.  
In recognition of the burdens and costs associated with 
detainees, the United States has decided to change the way it fights 
terrorism. In January 2005, U.S. Army Colonel Gary Cheek, then 
the U.S. Commander for Eastern Afghanistan, described a new 
policy that runs contrary to customary thinking about how to win 
wars: I ye told our commanders, for example, to minimize the 
number of Afghan nationals or others that they detain. 1  
According to the Washington Post, [t] he U.S. military is taking as 
few prisoners as possible in its campaign against al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, in part to forestall [more] complaints 
about its conduct. Indeed, the United States has not. transferred 
new prisoners to Guantanamo in more than five years.6 It is a safe 
bet that the United States will not move any more terrorist suspects 
there in the future. 
Perhaps the United States should have learned not to take 
prisoners sooner. Whenever you hear complaints about how the 
United States has handled Guantanamo, you might ask yourself 
what America s most loyal NATO allies those who have been 
fighting beside the United States in Afghanistan for seven years 
are doing with their prisoners. Where is the French equivalent of 
Guantanamo where French forces hold their captured detainees? 
And where are the German, Dutch, or Canadian detainee facilities? 
Do any of the domestic courts of these countries have jurisdiction 
over the detainees? Have there been allegations of abuse or calls 
for release of their prisoners? 
These are all fine questions, but they have no answers for a 
simple reason: our NATO allies have been wise enough not to take 
and hold prisoners in Afghanistan.' They have avoided this 
million). 
4. World in Brief U.S. Military Is Directed to Take Fewer Prisoners in Afghanistan, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2005, at Al2. 
5. Id. 
6. See Tim Golden, U.S. Says it Fears Detainee Abuse in Repatriation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2006, at 1 (reporting that the last new detainees were transferred into 
Guantanamo on September 22, 2004). 
7. See David Bosco, A Duty NATO Is Dodging in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Nov. 
5, 2006, at B7 ("NATO countries have essentially opted out of the detainee 
business. Before committing their troops to combat areas, the Canadian, Dutch 
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controversial task and consequently have not endured the 
concomitant hazards, controversy, expense, and litigation.' Only 
the United States made the blunder of thinking that it should take 
prisoners in this war. But surely it has learned its lesson now. 
Is the new policy of not taking prisoners something to 
celebrate? Opponents of the United States counterterrorism 
policies initially might think so. After all, their mounting of 
criticism and filing of lawsuits helped to achieve this result. But if 
critics have welcomed the new approach, perhaps they did not 
think through all of the consequences. 
In my view, the United States decision not to take prisoners 
has not been an improvement for anyone. As the United States has 
been driven to stop taking and holding enemy combatants as 
prisoners, it has put more emphasis on alternatives. Perhaps the 
most important of these alternatives is targeted killing. Rather than 
capturing al Qaeda kingpins, the United States dispatches them 
with guided missiles and bombs.' Or the United States simply plans 
military operations that use such overwhelming firepower that no 
enemies will survive. ° 
Think of the consequences: unlike the detainees at 
Guantanamo, the suspects who are targeted and killed receive no 
combatant status hearings to determine whether they really are 
fighters, no determination of their guilt of war crimes, and no 
habeas corpus rights." They just receive the death penalty. Yet, 
surprisingly, for whatever reason, the United States generally gets a 
pass in public relations. The killing of a suspected al Qaeda 
leader may make the news for a few days usually accompanied by 
celebratory editorials, even from what are otherwise the most 
and British governments signed agreements with the Afghan Government stating 
that any captured fighters would be handed over to Afghan authorities rather than 
to American forces."). 
8. See id. ("[T]hey don't want any part of the prisoner scandals that have 
dogged American forces."). 
9. For a more detailed discussion of targeted killing, see Maggs, supra note 
1, at 1001-03. See also Peter M. Cullen, The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign 
Against Terror, 48 JOINT FORCE Q. 22 (2008); Daniel Byman, Targeted Killing, 
American Style, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at B13; Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of 
Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al. 
10. See Maggs, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (discussing military press releases that 
describe these tactics). 
11. See Douglass W. Cassel, Targeted Killings: What We Don't Know, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Feb. 28, 2007, at 6. 
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questioning newspapers:2 After a day or so in the news, no one 
ever hears about the killing again. 
Another alternative to taking prisoners is to turn them over to 
Afghan authorities!' Again, this is not necessarily an improvement: 
Can you think of anyone who would rather be held in an Afghan 
prison than the safe and now heavily scrutinized facilities at 
Guantanamo? But still no one complains; for purposes of public 
relations, leaving detainees in someone else s hands has clearly 
turned out to be preferable. 
Finally, the United States has resorted to the alternative of 
simply letting many of its prisoners go free. This practice may 
make for good media coverage, but it is extremely dangerous. In 
his dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Scalia described some of 
the consequences of freeing Guantanamo detainees: 
At least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from 
Guantanamo Bay have returned to the 
battlefield.... Some have been captured or 
killed.... But others have succeeded in carrying on 
their atrocities against innocent civilians. In one 
case, a detainee released from Guantanamo Bay 
masterminded the kidnapping of two Chinese dam 
workers, one of whom was later shot to death .... 
Another former detainee promptly ... murdered a 
United Nations engineer and three Afghan 
soldiers.... Still another murdered an Afghan 
judge.... [Another] released detainee carried out a 
suicide bombing against Iraqi soldiers in Mosul, 
74 Iraq. 
Because the United States thoroughly has learned the lesson 
not to take or hold prisoners, we can expect more releases. Their 
post-detention conduct is likely also to be harmful. Yet, despite all 
of the violence and death that results, calls for releasing the 
Guantanamo prisoners continue to pressure the United States. 
12. Editorial, A Good Day in Iraq, WASH. POST, Jun. 9, 2006, at A22 (cheering 
the United States' targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda 
in Iraq). 
13. See Matthew Waxman, Beyond Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 
A17 (describing agreement to turn detainees over to Afghan authorities). 
14. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
10_Qs_Maggs (Adine).docx 4/20/2009  1:35 PM 
5082 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:5 
’
      
            
 
A second lesson that the United States has learned from 
detaining enemy combatants at Guantanamo is not to rely on 
Supreme Court precedent. The Department of Defense used to 
take the Supreme Court s word very seriously. In December 2001, 
shortly after the President issued his executive order directing that 
enemy combatants be tried by military commission,15 I received 
orders as an Army Reserve judge advocate to report to the 
Pentagon. Over several months, both on active duty and in a 
reserve status, I took part in a team effort to devise rules for military 
commissions. Like everyone else involved, I dutifully read and 
analyzed what appeared to be the leading precedents on the 
treatment of enemy war criminals: uirin:b Yamashita:7 Eisentrager,18 
and so forth. 
In retrospect, we were awfully na ve to think that these old 
decisions would matter much. Although a plurality partly relied on 
Quirin in Hamdi,19 the Supreme Court gave almost no weight to 
Quirin, Yamashita, and Eisentrager in Rasul," Hamdan,21 and 
Boumediene The Court, to be sure, did not expressly overrule any 
of these decisions. Instead, in one case after another, the Court 
cleverly distinguished them,23 deemed them to have been already 
overruled by other cases or new treaties,-' or characterized features 
15. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
16. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding trial of Nazi saboteurs by 
military commission). 
17. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (upholding conviction of Japanese 
military officer for war crimes despite challenges to the charged crime and 
procedures). 
18. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (concluding that the federal 
courts did not have jurisdiction over German war criminals, convicted of war 
crimes by a military commission in China and then transferred to Germany). 
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that the United States has authority to detain enemy combatants 
captured in the war on terror). 
20. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding the federal habeas corpus 
statute, as then written, reached detainees held at Guantanamo). 
21. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (exercising habeas corpus 
jurisdiction over detainee at Guantanamo and striking down plans to try him by 
military commission). 
22. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that the detainees 
at Guantanamo have a constitutional right to habeas corpus). 
23. See, e.g., id. at 2257 (distinguishing Eisentrager based on differences 
between Landsberg Prison in post-war occupied Germany and the detention 
facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). 
24. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 617-18 (concluding that "[t]he force of [the 
Yamashita] precedent . . . has been seriously undermined by post-World War II 
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of the cases as non-essential to their holdings.25 But however the 
Court may have described its recent decisions, the Department of 
Defense surely no longer views the Court s precedents regarding 
detainees in the same way. It has learned the lesson that the 
Supreme Court is not simply interpreting prior decisions. On the 
contrary, the Court is actively setting and resetting the United 
States detainee policy. I would not be surprised if its attorneys now 
ask themselves questions such as: What would Justice Kennedy (the 
author of Boumediene) think? Or what would Justice Stevens (the 
author of Hamdan) say? 
The third important lesson is that the United States stands 
alone in the world when it comes to the application of the law of 
war and humanitarian law issues, especially with respect to 
detainees. Our enemies members of al Qaeda and the Taliban 
do not follow these laws and no one expects them to do so. And 
our allies, with rare exceptions, do not take and hold prisoners. So 
the laws do not generally apply to them. When issues arise, in 
courts or in international discussions, they almost always involve the 
United States. Because other nations have different political and 
diplomatic agendas, and do not share the United States military 
burdens, the United States has learned that it cannot expect them 
to interpret the laws of war and humanitarian laws in exactly the 
same ways that it does. 
4. What is left for the Supreme Court to decide after the Boumediene 
decision? 
The Supreme Court left open several questions in Boumediene. 
Most notably, while the Court decided that federal courts may 
assert habeas corpus jurisdiction over all of the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Supreme Court did not determine 
what substantive rights the detainees have or whether their 
substantive rights are adequately protected.26 As long as detainees 
developments"); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479 (concluding that a subsequent case already 
overruled "the statutory predicate to Eisentrager' s holding"). 
25. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 605 (concluding that the law of war does not 
recognize conspiracy to commit war crimes as an offense even though the 
defendants in Quirin had been charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes 
because the Court in Quirin had "declined to address whether the offense actually 
qualified as a violation of the law"). 
26. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 ("It bears repeating that our opinion does 
not address the content of the law that governs petitioners' detention. That is a 
matter yet to be determined."). 
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remain at Guantanamo, federal courts will be busy answering these 
questions. 
Because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that these basic 
questions are undecided, I will address another open issue that has 
received less attention. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court rejected 
the Government s argument that federal courts could not exercise 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay because the base is located within the sovereign territory of 
Cuba, a foreign country.2 ' The Court held (arguably overruling 
Eisentrager) that habeas corpus jurisdiction turns on functional 
considerations rather than actual sovereignty.-8 Applying a 
functional test, the Court concluded that the federal courts could 
exercise jurisdiction based largely on the following key factor: The 
detainees ... are held in a territory that, while technically not part 
of the United States, is under the complete and total control of our 
Government. 29 
The Supreme Court, in my estimation, must not have 
appreciated the full implications of making actual control of 
territory rather than sovereignty the determinative factor for 
habeas corpus jurisdiction. Indeed, this factor, if applied literally, 
might have sweeping and problematic effects in the future. It 
threatens to give almost any prisoner captured by the United States 
in any likely future conflict a right to have a federal habeas corpus 
petition heard. 
This possible consequence bodes trouble because the United 
States is the dominant military power in the world. When the 
United States fights an enemy anywhere, our forces almost always 
are quickly in complete and total control of the territory in which 
they fight. For example, when the United States invaded Iraq in 
2003, the Iraqi Government quickly collapsed. Although the 
United States did not claim sovereignty over Iraq, it did become the 
occupying power in total and complete control of the country.30 
Similarly, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the 
Taliban Government disintegrated, and the United States 
27. Id. at 2248. 
28. See id. at 2258. On the tension between Boumediene and Eisentraget; see id. 
at 2298-302 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 2262. 
30. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO3/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf  
(recognizing the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers in 
Iraq). 
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temporarily took control.31 Likewise, our forces took no orders 
from Serbia when occupying Kosovo in 1999.32 
Under the functional approach of Boumediene, would any 
prisoners taken during those invasions or other similar conflicts 
have a right to habeas corpus in federal court? If so, this result 
could be very problematic. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, for 
example, the United States took over 50,000 Iraqi prisoners in just 
three days.33 The United States—and no one else—was in complete 
control of the areas of Kuwait and Iraq where the United States 
captured these prisoners. But surely the Supreme Court would not 
hold that all of them would have a right to habeas corpus. The 
federal courts would be overwhelmed. Yet, how the Court would 
reach this result under its new functional test remains to be seen. 
10. What is the most important issue for American national security? 
The most important legal issue in national security is what body 
of law should regulate governmental responses to terrorism. As I 
have described in a separate article, opponents of counterterrorism 
measures typically argue that they should be judged by legal 
guarantees designed to protect criminal suspects.3' But 
governments typically respond that they are not addressing mere 
crime.'' Instead, they are fighting a war against terrorism, and that 
the law applicable to armed conflict should govern their actions. 
These two bodies of law often point in different directions. 
The police, for example, cannot simply shoot criminal suspects; the 
police have to try to arrest them first.36 But the military generally 
can attack and kill enemy combatants that s why targeted killing 
can occur. 37  Similarly, the police cannot detain criminal suspects 
31. In Afghanistan, unlike in Iraq, the United States quickly handed over 
formal sovereignty to a transitional administration. See Grant T. Harris, The Era of 
Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 48-49 (2006). 
32. The United States led a two-month air war against Serbia and then 
occupied the Kosovo province with other NATO forces. See Joseph C. Sweeney, 
The Just War Ethic in International Law, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1865, 1883 (2004). 
33. See Eric Schmitt, War in the Gulf: POW's; General's "Wild Guess": 50,000 
Prisoners, So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at A10. 
34. Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Counterterrorism Measures Without 
Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement of Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 661, 663 
(2007). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 674. 
37. Id. at 675-76. 
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without charges, but the military can hold enemy combatants as 
prisoners for the duration of a conflict.38  And while the police 
cannot wiretap a criminal suspect s telephone calls without a 
warrant, the military constantly eavesdrops on enemy 
communications. 
I do not believe that this important issue has a simple answer. 
Modern terrorism resembles both criminal conduct and military 
aggression. Likewise, the perpetrators of terrorism resemble both 
criminals and combatants. Accordingly, good arguments may exist 
for judging counterterrorism actions under criminal law standards 
or judging them under the laws of war. Even seven years after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, a consensus view has not emerged. 
My proposal for addressing this question is easily stated, but 
certainly difficult to accomplish: we should develop a third body of 
law to address counterterrorism efforts!' The laws regulating law 
enforcement will apply to traditional crime fighting measures, the 
laws of war will apply to traditional military actions, and this new 
body of law would apply to government actions aimed at 
suppressing terrorism and catching and punishing terrorists. This 
body of law might resemble the rules governing law enforcement in 
some respects and the laws of war in others. But the content of the 
new body of law should be determined based on policy 
considerations, not simply by analogizing terrorism to crime or 
warfare. 
38. Id. at 677-78. 
39. Id. at 684-85. 
40. Id. at 702-09. 
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